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Littlejohn (2017) has recently complained that, though many philosophers accept reasons-first 
epistemology, there haven’t been any arguments presented in its support. To rectify this situation, I 
will here present an argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in 
particular in that – unlike them – it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and 
account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.  
 
Ever since Williamson (2000) called into question the once widely accepted assumption that we need 
to understand knowledge in terms of justification and claimed instead that our evidence is what we 
know, that knowledge is not analyzable, and that anyway remembering, perceiving etc. are ways of 
knowing, the order of matters epistemological has been up in the air. One question this state of 
confusion gives rise to is, “Which epistemic phenomenon is fundamental, and can thus be taken to 
explain the others?” My discussion will address this question, focusing on a comparison of reasons-
first epistemology with knowledge-first epistemology. I will argue that, rather than taking knowledge 
to be fundamental (with respect to justification and reasons), we should see epistemic reasons as 
fundamental (with respect to knowledge and justification).  
 
Here is an example to illustrate the issue. One evening as he enters his sister Hiltrud’s bedroom, Klaus 
hears that she is snoring and, for that reason, believes that she is sleeping. I assume that in this case 
Klaus’s belief that Hiltrud is sleeping is justified; indeed, it is knowledge. The Williamsonian 
knowledge-first account of the epistemic standing of Klaus’s belief is this: Perceiving that Hiltrud is 
snoring is a way of knowing that Hiltrud is snoring, since perception is a kind of knowledge. In virtue 
of this knowledge Klaus possesses the fact that Hiltrud is snoring as evidence that his sister is 
sleeping, he thereby has justification for his belief that she is sleeping, and the belief, since it is based 
on his auditory knowledge, is justified. By contrast, my preferred reasons-first account has it that 
Klaus’s hearing that Hiltrud is snoring brings an epistemic reason for believing that she is sleeping 
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(viz. that she is snoring) into his possession. Since Klaus believes that Hiltrud is sleeping in competent 
response to this reason, Klaus both knows and justifiably believes this. His hearing is not itself 
knowledge, though it provides justification for his belief that Hiltrud is snoring and is the source of 
his knowledge that she is snoring (Schmidt 2019). 
 
Knowledge-first and reasons-first, as I understand them, are concerned with the explanatory order of 
central epistemic phenomena. According to knowledge-first, we can provide a deeper explanation of 
the possession of evidence or reasons and of justification by turning to knowledge. By contrast, 
according to reasons-first, we can only explain how agents know or justifiably believe something if 
we turn to the reasons they have, because the latter are fundamental to both epistemic standings.  
 
Since the central concern of both views is explanatory fundamentality, the obvious way to argue for 
either one is by pointing to its explanatory merits in comparison to the competition. One can show 
that, say, “X-first” is better than “Y-first” if, on the assumption that X is explanatorily fundamental, 
the relevant phenomena can be better explained – or be better done justice to – than on the assumption 
that Y is explanatorily basic. This is exactly what I intend to do here. Reasons-first gives a better 
account than knowledge-first of the justification of our beliefs, including our most fundamental 
perceptual beliefs; in addition, it – unlike knowledge-first – does justice to the specific ways in which 
perception is epistemically significant.1  
 
Here is how I proceed: In the next section, I highlight the epistemic roles of perception and certain 
features of epistemic justification. Next, I show that knowledge-first views which equate perception 
with a kind of knowledge (called “PIK”) cannot satisfactorily account for either and that, while 
rejecting this equation helps, the resulting knowledge-first view (called “PINK”) still has explanatory 
problems. I then present my own reasons-first view in more detail and argue that it explains the 
epistemic relevance of perception and epistemic justification. As a nonconceptualist picture of 
perceptual experience, it steers clear of the pitfalls of both conceptualism and stark particularism 
when it comes to the epistemic significance of perception. I close with a short conclusion. 
 
The Epistemic Significance of Perception and Epistemic Justification 
Perceptual experience is of central epistemic importance. It – to be exact, genuine perception2 – puts 
our surroundings in our view. It gives us knowledge of the world and justifies our empirical beliefs. 
Without perceptual awareness of the world, our epistemic situation would be much worse. The 
epistemic significance of perceptual experience is connected to the very concepts of knowledge and 
epistemic justification: For there to be more than true guesses about a subject matter, i.e. for there to 
3 
 
be justified belief or knowledge, there has to be a connection between belief and truth, which in the 
case of empirical belief or knowledge is to say that it has to have a connection to the world. This 
connection is, at bottom, supplied by perception.  
 
Let me highlight just two important epistemic roles of perception. First, perception is a starting point 
for appropriate reasoning about the world. For instance, that Klaus perceives that Hiltrud is snoring 
puts him in a position to appropriately infer that she must have been tired. Second, conscious 
perception allows us to show others how we came to know something perceptually and thus to 
vindicate our perceptual knowledge claims (Roessler forthcoming). For instance, Klaus might answer 
the question, “How do you know that Hiltrud is snoring?”, with, “By the vibrating sound of her 
breathing”. 
 
To connect these claims to my discussion, it is a point in favor of any “X-first” epistemology if it 
respects the epistemic significance of perceptual experience and even more so if it is able to provide 
an account of its particular epistemic roles. 
 
Next, epistemic justification is a positive standing of doxastic attitudes. A belief is ex post 
(doxastically) justified when the subject holds it for good reasons. It is merely ex ante 
(propositionally) justified when she possesses the same good reasons to accept the belief, but either 
doesn’t form the belief at all or forms it for other, bad reasons. Klaus’s belief that Hiltrud is sleeping 
is ex post justified: There is a good reason for him to form it (viz. that Hiltrud is snoring), he has the 
reason (thanks to his auditory perception), and he forms the belief in response to it. But if Klaus, 
though he hears that Hiltrud is snoring, were instead to form the belief on the basis of the horoscope’s 
prediction that his sister would go to sleep early today, we should say that although Klaus’s belief is 
ex ante justified, it is not ex post justified. 
 
The ex ante/ex post distinction applies generally to responses we can give for reasons. It is applicable 
to any of a subject’s actual or potential beliefs, but also to action, for example: When Klaus turns off 
the light in the bedroom for the reason that Hiltrud is sleeping, he does so for a good reason; his action 
is ex post justified. However, imagine that Klaus’s reason to turn off the light is the bad reason that 
his little brother gets scared when he does so. Then his action is not ex post justified, even if ex ante 
justified.  
 
The easiest way to spell out the contrast between ex ante and ex post epistemic justification is by 
appeal to reasons (or to evidence), as I have just done. It is noteworthy, however, that the terminology 
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goes back to Goldman (1979), who doesn’t appeal to reasons. He takes ex post justification to be 
prior, as the status a belief has when it is the output of a reliable process. From this he derives ex ante 
justification, the justification a proposition has for a subject if it would be suitable for her to accept 
it. If she could acquire the belief in her current situation by way of a reliable belief-forming process, 
it is ex ante justified. And if a belief isn’t formed on the basis of a reliable process, even though the 
subject had a reliable belief forming process available to acquire it, it is ex ante, but not ex post 
justified. 
 
Overall, any adequate “X-first” epistemology must cohere with and account for the shape and extent 
of epistemic justification. Together with the epistemic significance of perception, this gives us two 
explanatory desiderata which “X-first” epistemologies ought to satisfy. 
 
PIK on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification 
Now that I have introduced the relevant explanatory desiderata, the next item on my agenda is to 
argue that knowledge-first views do poorly with respect to them. I will focus on two variants of 
knowledge-first epistemology, which I call “PIK” and “PINK”. The first variant, endorsed e.g. by 
Byrne (2016), follows Williamson in maintaining that perceiving is a special way of knowing (PIK). 
According to the second variant, perception is not a kind of knowledge (PINK); rather, it provides 
knowledge, but without relying on epistemic reasons (Littlejohn 2017, 2018a, 2018b).  
 
Let me turn to PIK first. That Klaus hears that Hiltrud is snoring entails that he knows that she is 
snoring, and even stronger, his hearing is nothing but his way of knowing that Hiltrud is snoring. 
Perception is partly constituted by knowledge. Perception, as a kind of knowledge, entails belief.3 In 
support, note that, first off, knowing that p plausibly requires the subject to accept p as true, i.e., to 
believe p. Second, as Glock (2012, 216) argues, situations in which a subject interacts successfully 
with her environment, i.e., situations in which she proceeds from knowing that p, are paralleled by 
situations in which the subject exercises the same epistemic capacities, but the world does not 
cooperate, so that she fails to know. Our natural fallback option for describing the latter subject is as 
(merely) believing rather than knowing that p. Since subjects in the good and bad cases exercise the 
same epistemic capacities, the subject who knows that p thereby plausibly also believes that p. PIK 
is naturally wedded to conceptualism: Given that perceiving is a way of knowing and thus of 
believing, and given that believing constitutively involves the exercise of conceptual capacities – and 
that belief has a conceptual and propositional content – perceptual experience is a conceptual state 




PIK is a version of knowledge-first, as it endorses the claim that knowledge is the most fundamental 
factive mental state. Further, perception cannot plausibly get its status as knowledge from prior 
epistemic normative reasons, as it is our most fundamental access to the world. Rather, subjects 
possess epistemic reasons and are in a position to have justified empirical beliefs in virtue of knowing 
perceptually. So, knowledge is more fundamental than both possessed reasons and justification. 
 
Now how well does PIK perform regarding the explanatory desiderata? Byrne (2016) attacks broadly 
reasons-first positions precisely because he thinks they cannot account for the epistemic significance 
of perception. Ironically, it is the PIK view favored by Byrne that undermines the special epistemic 
significance of perceptual experience. For, according to it, a subject’s perception that p comes out as 
just another instance of knowledge that p. Think again of Klaus. If his hearing that Hiltrud is snoring 
is no more than a way of knowing that she is snoring, what is the epistemic point of the whole 
“technicolor phenomenology” involved in hearing (McGinn 1991: 1)? And why does he start with 
perceptual knowledge as distinct from generic knowledge? After all, any instance of knowledge that 
Hiltrud is snoring is all by itself, without perceptual forerunners and without experiential character, 
knowledge and thus also something from which Klaus can reason.  
 
Let me illustrate this with the help of the imaginary superblindsighter, who comes to believe things 
about her surroundings immediately on the basis of subpersonal processing, while skipping the 
intermediary step of conscious perception. In my example, let’s call Klaus’s “superdeafhearer” 
equivalent “Blaus”. His auditory system fails to output a conscious auditory experience, immediately 
producing in him the true belief that Hiltrud is snoring, a belief that is safe and reliably caused and 
so, according to the proponents of PIK, both justified and knowledge.4 (There are different ways one 
might fill out the details of the superdeafhearer case. For current purposes, we may allow that Blaus, 
though he has no conscious auditory experience of Hiltrud’s snoring, has other auditory beliefs about 
Hiltrud’s breathing, such as that it has a certain vibrating quality or a certain volume.) Given PIK, it 
seems that Blaus, despite lacking conscious auditory perception of Hiltrud’s snoring, is epistemically 
speaking no worse off than Klaus. Blaus knows that his sister is snoring just as well as Klaus does, 
and he is able to reason on this basis just like Klaus. But this means that according to PIK, conscious 
perception has zero epistemic significance, as it improves Klaus’s epistemic situation in no way over 
Blaus’s. 
 
Byrne preempts this kind of objection by arguing that Blaus is Klaus’s zombie twin, so that my worry 
relies on the highly contentious presupposition that zombies are possible – it doesn’t have to be taken 
seriously. However, this is incorrect. Sure, under a very coarse-grained description, Blaus and Klaus 
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are functional twins: Both know that Hiltrud is snoring, both believe on that basis that she is sleeping, 
and so forth. But we can provide a more fine-grained description of their functioning, which uncovers 
many substantial differences between them. For instance, Klaus’s knowledge that Hiltrud is snoring 
is processed within his auditory system, whereas Blaus’s knowledge is processed in his central 
cognitive system. If Klaus comes to believe that he’s hallucinating that Hiltrud is snoring, he will still 
be stuck with his auditory experience/belief that Hiltrud is snoring, whereas Blaus will be able to 
abandon his belief that Hiltrud is snoring. Given these significant functional differences between the 
two, my objection cannot be brushed off as just a version of the zombie worry. Rather, it highlights 
the fact that PIK cannot account for the special epistemic significance of perceptual experience. 
 
But isn’t PIK doing alright anyway because at least perceptual knowledge with conscious perception 
is epistemically no worse than perceptual knowledge without? Both get the job of providing 
knowledge done equally well, and this is good enough to ensure that perception is epistemically 
significant. I disagree that it is sufficient to show that perceptually knowing is no worse than 
generically knowing. For, as argued above, on our ordinary understanding, conscious perceptual 
experience is of special significance to our epistemic life. It plays a distinct role, which the PIK 
theorist cannot do justice to.  
 
PIK also fails with respect to the explanatory desideratum concerning the shape and extent of 
epistemic justification. In particular, it cannot account for the ex ante justification we have for our 
most fundamental perceptual beliefs. On PIK, our perceptual experiences are our most fundamental 
perceptual beliefs. Accordingly, there has to be a fact of the matter as to whether e.g. Klaus’s auditory 
experience/belief is ex ante justified. Take a situation in which Klaus does not yet consciously hear 
that Hiltrud is snoring – imagine that he has just entered the bedroom and is slightly distracted, so 
that he is just on the verge of becoming conscious that she is snoring. In this situation, we can 
legitimately raise the question: Is the auditory belief/experience ex ante justified for Klaus? It is 
extremely odd to ascribe such a status to an auditory experience, which doesn’t seem to be a mental 
state that can be justified or unjustified. Ignoring these qualms, however, it has to be that the auditory 
belief/experience is ex ante justified for Klaus, for there is nothing wrong with his auditory 
perception; moreover, it can contribute to the justification of further beliefs.  
 
The PIK theorist might deal with this issue in several ways. First, maybe a subpersonal mental state 
with the content that Hiltrud is snoring (or something the like) has to be processed in Klaus’s auditory 
system for his auditory belief to be ex ante justified. But why should subpersonal processing make a 
difference? It seems just as well to say that, as soon as the sound of Hiltrud’s snoring impinges on his 
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ear drums, or as soon as he is in a position to hear that she is snoring, or as soon as she is in fact 
snoring, his auditory belief is ex ante justified. That is to say, subpersonal processing seems to be just 
as well-suited to fix the belief’s ex ante status as any other causal descendant of Hiltrud’s snoring. 
Consequently, it appears to be arbitrary whether Klaus’s auditory belief is ex ante justified: It may 
come out as ex ante justified if we appeal to the state of his environment, but as ex ante unjustified if 
we appeal to his subpersonal processing. We can get out of this conundrum if we restrict providers 
of ex ante justification to prior awareness-involving states of Klaus. But then Klaus’s auditory belief 
comes out as unjustified even though his auditory sense functions perfectly, for he is not aware of 
any relevant states prior to his hearing that Hiltrud is snoring.5 
 
Secondly, the PIK theorist might insist that the auditory belief is ex ante justified given that it would 
be knowledge if Klaus were to form it.6 So, we simply need to figure out whether this counterfactual 
is true: “Given his current situation, if Klaus were to form the auditory belief/experience that Hiltrud 
is snoring, he would know perceptually that she is snoring”. The advantage of this proposal is that it 
allows us to sidestep the issue of which antecedent state is responsible for the ex ante status of basic 
perceptual belief.  
 
But how do we determine whether the relevant counterfactual is true? For instance, it seems that 
Klaus, when on the verge of becoming auditorily aware that Hiltrud is snoring, would know that she 
is snoring if he were to have the experience. But this seems no less true when the sound waves are 
just starting to affect Klaus’s eardrums, or when he is standing in front of Hiltrud’s door, just about 
to open it, or when he is merely heading for her room. For in these cases too, the closest possible 
worlds in which he has an auditory experience that Hiltrud is snoring are worlds in which he perceives 
that she is snoring (rather than the much more fantastic worlds in which he has an illusion or 
hallucinates that she is snoring). On the other hand, one might think that in the latter situations the 
counterfactual comes out false. For in them, if Klaus were to have an auditory experience that Hiltrud 
is snoring, his experience would arise in his auditory system without being caused in the right way 
by Hiltrud’s snoring via his subpersonal processing. But if one goes down that road, it’s not clear that 
the situation in which the information that Hiltrud is snoring is already being processed subpersonally 
in Klaus’s auditory system is any different. Even then one might worry that the auditory experience 
would arise without being caused by the relevant processing – that Klaus has the experience and the 
relevant processing doesn’t guarantee that he has the experience because of the processing. Overall, 
this second response on behalf of PIK fails to convince because it fails to provide firm ground for 
classifying basic perceptual belief as ex ante justified, assessing such belief as ex ante justified either 




Thirdly, one might deny that the status is applicable to our most basic beliefs about the world. 
However, if perceiving is genuinely a kind of believing, how could we deny that there is a question 
of its ex ante justification? If, in hearing that Hiltrud is snoring, Klaus genuinely believes this, we can 
legitimately raise the question whether his belief would be suitable, or whether he has good reasons 
to believe – at least, I can think of no non-ad hoc reason why not. Think of it this way: In forming the 
belief that p, a subject jointly exercises the relevant conceptual capacities that specify the content p, 
and this is something she either does for good reasons or not. For conceptual capacities are a kind of 
capacities that can be exercised for good reasons. But then the question of whether the subject has 
good reasons so to believe can legitimately be raised. (I will get back to this point below.) Just this 
possibility is excluded for Klaus’s so-called perceptual belief, according to the third response. Let me 
conclude, then, that it doesn’t solve the problem. 
 
So, PIK fails to provide a satisfying account of the ex ante justification of our most fundamental 
perceptual beliefs. This is because it mistakenly tries to conceive of perception as a kind of belief, 
which raises the issue of its ex ante justification, which leads into confusion exactly because 
perceptual experience is a kind of mental state to which such a status cannot be applied. Since, further, 
PIK cannot do justice to the special epistemic significance of perceptual experience, it should be 
abandoned. One way of doing this is to stick with knowledge-first while dropping the idea that 
perception is a kind of knowledge. I turn to such a view in the next section. 
 
PINK on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification 
For PINK, perception is neither a kind of knowledge nor does it provide epistemic reasons. Klaus’s 
belief that Hiltrud is sleeping is not justified or knowledge because of reasons provided by perception. 
Still, perception provides perceptual knowledge, which we can explain by appeal to what the subject 
perceives. According to Littlejohn (2016, 2017) and Roessler (forthcoming), such explanations 
appeal to the recognitional or classificatory abilities in operation in perception, which provide as their 
output perceptual knowledge, but whose operation doesn’t rely on any epistemic reasons.  
 
On Roessler’s view, the epistemic role of perceptual experience is to provide substantial, vindicating 
explanations of perceptual knowledge claims. The perceptual abilities appealed to in such 
explanations presuppose that certain features are experienced by the subject, which he can pick out 
with the help of perceptual demonstratives; it is the perceptual presence of these features that enables 
the subject to recognize or properly classify the relevant object and thus to acquire knowledge. For 
instance, Klaus’s conscious auditory perception manifests his capacity to tell by the sound of Hiltrud’s 
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breathing that she is snoring; he can pick out demonstratively the specific features of Hiltrud’s 
breathing which enable him to tell that she is snoring; and this explains how he knows this. So his 
auditory perception is the source of his knowledge that Hiltrud is snoring. On this picture, perceptual 
knowledge is groundless – it is not based on prior reasons provided by perception, and so reasons are 
not fundamental to knowledge. Nonetheless, the view accords a central epistemic role to our 
perceptual capacities, whose employment provides our ground-level knowledge of the world as well 
as vindicating explanations of our knowledge. This picture of the epistemic role of perception is a 
natural fit with a rejection of the claim that perception has a content at all, be it conceptual or 
nonconceptual, and an endorsement of the view that perception is a relation between perceiver and 
perceived object. The latter view is associated with positions such as Campbell’s (2002) relationalism 
or Martin’s (2006) naïve realism, as well as Littlejohn’s (2017) stark particularism (to be discussed 
below).  
 
PINK can help itself to an intriguing account of epistemic justification, which makes knowledge 
fundamental to justification: All beliefs, including perceptual beliefs, are justified to the extent that 
they are knowledge (knowledge being the norm of belief) and to the extent that – as knowledge – 
they can provide reasons for further responses. In Littlejohn’s (2017: 42) words, “the justificatory 
status of a belief depends upon whether it can provide rational support by providing us with reasons”. 
For instance, Klaus’s belief that Hiltrud is snoring is justified because it can provide him with a reason 
to believe that she is sleeping, and thus with a reason to turn off the light and quietly leave the room. 
We can think of this as a forward-looking account of epistemic justification.  
 
I find PINK much more compelling than PIK. Still, its account of the epistemic role of perception 
and of the shape and extent of epistemic justification is not fully satisfactory. Let’s begin with the 
first point. On the one hand, I find Roessler’s account of the epistemic significance of perception in 
terms of vindicating explanations of knowledge claims, which require conscious perceptual 
awareness of perceived features, quite compelling. But on the other hand, even this doesn’t fully 
capture the epistemic role that perception plays for us. The superdeafhearer’s problem is not only that 
he cannot vindicate his knowledge claims, that he can do no more than to insist that he “just knows”. 
He has the further problem that, according to himself, his perceptual beliefs are not justified, that he 
apparently holds them for no reason. He finds himself with perceptual beliefs whose credentials are, 
from his perspective, up in the air. But his perspective is what counts in deliberation. Since he blankly 
finds himself with his perceptual beliefs, he has to think of himself as holding those beliefs for no 
reason, and so cannot appropriately use them as starting points in deliberation or reasoning. This 
highlights that conscious perception is needed to provide reasons for basic empirical belief. This 
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problem is disconnected from whether a subject can defend her knowledge claims to others, as it is 
about whether she holds a belief for a reason, from her own perspective; PINK doesn’t have the 
resources to explain this. So perception’s epistemic role of providing the rational foundation of our 
reasoning by providing reasons for perceptual belief cannot be captured by PINK. 
 
To accept PINK’s forward-looking account of epistemic justification is already to bite that bullet: If 
the justification of belief is due to the reasons it provides for further responses, perception is out of 
the justificatory equation. But there is a further problem with the forward-looking account: It’s not 
that belief is justified because it can provide reasons; rather, justified belief can provide reasons 
because it is justified. To see this, think about ways in which the normative status of an entity and its 
normative difference-making powers may relate. 
 
(1) Something has a certain normative status because it has the power to make a difference with 
respect to a distinct normative status. Example: An agent is legally accountable for her actions 
because she has the power to perform actions that are morally praise- or blameworthy. (2) Something 
has the power to make a normative difference because it has a normative status of the same kind. 
Example: An employment contract has the power to make it illegal for an employer not to pay her 
employee because it is a legal employment contract. This all seems perfectly fine. What I find 
unbelievable is that something should itself acquire a certain status because it makes a normative 
difference of the same kind to something else. Just this would have to be the case for beliefs to be 
epistemically justified because they provide epistemic reasons. Let me explain. 
 
That a belief is epistemically justified because it provides the believer with moral reasons to act, for 
instance, is not problematic, as when Klaus’s justified belief that Hiltrud is sleeping provides him 
with a moral reason to turn off the light and leave the room. So, this might be a type (1) case, and 
Klaus’s belief might be epistemically justified because it provides a reason of a moral kind. What 
causes trouble, however, is the claim that a belief may be epistemically justified because it can provide 
epistemic reasons, as when Klaus’s belief that Hiltrud is snoring is allegedly epistemically justified 
because it can provide him with an epistemic reason to believe that she is sleeping. Compare: The 
premises of a valid argument can support its conclusion just in case they are independently supported 
by argument. But what explains what? It is certainly not true that the premises are rationally 
acceptable because they can support the conclusion. Rather, they can support the conclusion, or 
render it rationally acceptable, because they are independently supported by argument, or rationally 
acceptable. By analogy, a belief can provide epistemic reasons for further beliefs, and thus contributes 
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to their positive epistemic status, because it is epistemically justified. So, the epistemic justification 
of belief plausibly falls under type (2).  
 
Proponents of PINK might respond that any justified belief can in principle provide reasons for non-
epistemic responses, so there is no problem for the forward-looking account. I am not convinced, as 
there seems to be plenty of room for epistemically justified beliefs that have zero practical, moral, or 
other relevance, which therefore cannot provide an agent with any non-epistemic reasons.7 
Admittedly, it may still be that, as mentioned above, beliefs are justified because they are knowledge. 
However, either account of epistemic justification will be completely different than (what I take to 
be) PINK’s account of the justification of any of the other responses. For these, the view is that they 
are justified because supported by the subject’s reasons. But for belief, justification is due to its 
reasons-providing powers or to its own status as knowledge. This makes for an inelegant, disunified 
picture of the unitary phenomenon of justification.8 
 
Overall then, while PINK has better explanatory resources than PIK, it fails to give a fully satisfying 
account of both the epistemic significance of perceptual experience and of epistemic justification. 
 
Reasons-First on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic 
Justification 
So far, I have tried to show that neither variant of the knowledge-first view, PIK or PINK, fully 
satisfies the two explanatory desiderata under discussion. The next step in my argument is to show 
that reasons-first does a much better job. 
 
As briefly sketched above, on my picture, epistemic justification and knowledge arise from possessed 
epistemic reasons. The relevant reasons are normative epistemic reasons, facts that epistemically 
favor adopting certain doxastic attitudes, including belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment.9 
Think of knowledge and justified belief as belief for a reason, which requires the believer to manifest 
epistemic rational capacities to connect with and to be attuned to reality, in particular capacities to 
form the belief that the subject’s epistemic reasons favor for these reasons. A subject justifiably 
believes that p just in case, one, the epistemic reasons she possesses all things considered favor her 
accepting p and, two, in believing that p, she manifests her epistemic rational capacities. Knowledge 
is belief that is true because it is a competent response to possessed sufficient reasons: A subject 
knows that p just in case, one, her reasons sufficiently and all things considered favor her believing 
that p and, two, her belief that p is both a manifestation of her epistemic rational capacity and true 




By justifiably believing or knowing that p, the subject possesses that p as a reason which she can use 
in further reasoning, and correspondingly, we can think of epistemic rational capacities as capacities 
to possess epistemic reasons. In Schmidt (2019), I distinguish two kinds of manifestations of 
epistemic rational capacities – that is, two ways of possessing epistemic reasons –, justified beliefs 
on the one hand and presentational attitudes not in need of justification (or PANINIs) on the other. 
PANINIs are basic presentational attitudes like memory, rational intuition, or perception (which is 
my focus here), for which it doesn’t make sense to question their justificatory status.  
 
On my view, perception is not a kind of knowledge, nor is it a kind of belief, as it is not the 
manifestation of a capacity to adopt an attitude in the light of a possessed normative reason, but rather 
a response to unpossessed epistemic reasons. For we cannot perceive for a reason, nor is it something 
subjects do in the light of possessed reasons. We aren’t persuaded by the good reasons we have to 
perceive something, we just do, as a ground-level response to our environments.1011 Still, the account 
highlights that knowledge and perception have important structural commonalities: Both are true or 
correct because they are manifestations of epistemic rational capacities to be attuned to the world, 
and to have these capacities is to be sensitive to epistemic reasons. Perception, like belief, is geared 
towards attaining knowledge; it is how epistemic reasons for empirical belief are brought into the 
subject’s view in the first place. 
 
One way to make sense of the differences between perceptual experience and belief is by appeal to 
state nonconceptualism about perceptual experience (Schmidt 2015): Perceptual experience is 
nonconceptual – it is possible to perceive that p without exercising the concepts needed to specify the 
content that p. By contrast, belief is conceptual, for in order to believe that p, the subject has to 
exercise the concepts needed to specify the content that p. On this view, belief, but not perceptual 
experience, is constituted by a joint exercise of conceptual capacities. Plausibly, conceptual capacities 
are the kind of capacities we can consciously employ for good reasons, and consequently, belief is a 
kind of state that the subject can adopt or revise in the light of her reasons; in this sense, its conceptual 
nature puts it under the subject’s rational control and thus makes it suitable for us to question its 
justification. Since perception constitutively involves the activation not of conceptual, but rather of 
perceptual-discriminatory capacities, which are simply triggered in suitable circumstances as a 
manifestation of the subject’s ground-level sensitivity to the world, it cannot be adopted or revised in 
the light of the subject’s reasons. In this way, our lack of rational control over what we perceive can 
be explained by appeal to the nonconceptual nature of perception. And this in turn explains why it is 
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inappropriate to ascribe to perception the epistemic status of being justified or unjustified, but also 
why perception is ideally suited to be a starting point of our reasoning about the world. 
 
We can form justified beliefs and come to know in response to epistemic reasons we possess thanks 
to employing perceptual capacities that bring our environment into view. It is essential for perception 
to play this role that it both involves conscious awareness of the subject’s environment and that it be 
unassessable as justified or unjustified. Let me illustrate this again with the case of Blaus. As argued 
above, from Blaus’s perspective, the credentials of his auditory belief that Hiltrud is snoring are up 
in the air; he cannot be sure whether by believing he possesses a reason he can use in further 
deliberation or whether this is just some random belief he got stuck with. For belief is a kind of 
presentational attitude with respect to which the question of justification can legitimately be raised; 
it is justified only when it is a response to a normative reason the subject already possesses. Since 
Blaus’s subpersonal processing leading up to his auditory belief is not conscious, it is not a way for 
him of possessing a reason in support of the belief. So when Blaus comes to believe that Hiltrud is 
snoring, his belief isn’t justified, for it is not a response to a possessed reason.  
 
This illustrates that neither unconscious subpersonal states nor belief are able to fill the role of a 
starting point of deliberation. This is why conscious perception is of central epistemic significance – 
as a conscious state, it can provide the subject with reasons; and as a state that is not assessable as 
justified or unjustified, it can do so without forcing her to first worry about its justification. 
 
With respect to accounting for our ability to provide vindicating explanations of perceptual 
knowledge, I am happy to follow Roessler’s lead. Reasons-first is compatible with appealing to 
perceptual skills in vindicating explanations of knowledge, for we can think of such skills as part and 
parcel of the perceiver’s rational capacities to pick up on her environment. 
 
Littlejohn (2017), as a proponent of PINK, objects that perception is contentless, relating the perceiver 
to nothing but particulars, so that it cannot provide her with reasons in the form of pre-existing facts, 
given that facts always involve general elements. When perceivers exercise their capacities to 
recognize or categorize the bare particulars they are confronted with perceptually, they immediately 
end up with beliefs, not perceptual experiences; in belief, partly general contents are generated for 
the first time. Call Littlejohn’s view ‘stark particularism’. Part of his motivation is that there is no 





But this is not true. As I argue elsewhere, the exact metaphysical nature of (the content of) perceptual 
experience is in the end a pragmatic issue, i.e. an issue of which metaphysical presuppositions we 
need to make so that perception can best play all the theoretical roles we need it to play (Schmidt 
2015, Unpublished Manuscript). Theories which ascribe facts as perceptual contents (which, on my 
nonconceptualist picture, are not true Fregean propositions, but obtaining states of affairs including 
general elements), or theories which say that perception relates perceivers to such facts, can easily 
account for the existence of normative reasons; for how these come into the perceivers possession; 
and for how perceivers can believe, act, etc. in response to them. Littlejohn’s stark particularist 
account of perception, by contrast, raises worries as to how the world can do anything to favor certain 
responses. How could an entirely particular agglomeration normatively speak in favor of a certain 
response? In virtue of what might the application of a certain set of classifications or recognitional 
capacities, rather than any other, to this agglomeration be correct? How could subjects acquire 
capacities to classify and to correctly to respond to such agglomerations? Reasons-first epistemology, 
with its assumption that perception has a content, elegantly bypasses such worries. It therefore has an 
advantage over stark particularism. Overall, my nonconceptualist version of reasons-first steers an 
ideal middle path between conceptualism/PIK (which, by taking perception to be just another kind of 
conceptual belief, struggles to explain its special role in our reasoning) and stark particularism/PINK 
(which, by denying that perception has any kind of content, struggles to account for normative reasons 
and for our capacities to pick up on and respond to them). 
 
Finally, let me briefly address how reasons-first accounts for the extent and shape of epistemic 
justification. Any response that a subject can give for good reasons is ex ante justified to the extent 
that it is favored, all things considered, by the subject’s normative reasons. Reasons-first thus provides 
a unified account of this normative status, no matter whether we’re looking at action, belief, or other 
responses, and no matter whether we are dealing with basic perceptual beliefs or beliefs farther up 
the chain. Perceptual beliefs are ex ante justified just in case they are favored all things considered in 
the light of epistemic reasons possessed by the subject by perceiving. Since perceiving is not 
believing, but a distinct nonconceptual kind of state, we’re not stuck with thinking of perception as 
justified or unjustified. Finally, since reasons-first is not a forward-looking account of epistemic 




This concludes my argument for reasons-first epistemology. “X-first” epistemologies are positions 
concerning the relative explanatory fundamentality of certain epistemic phenomena. The natural way 
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to compare them is to investigate how well the relevant phenomena are indeed explained under the 
assumption that X is first. I have done this here by comparing how well reasons-first and knowledge-
first are able to explain both the specific ways in which perception is central to our epistemic lives, 
and the shape and extent of epistemic justification. 
 
My findings were that equating perception with a kind of knowledge (PIK) makes it extremely 
difficult for knowledge-first to accord any epistemic role to perception, as illustrated by 
superblindsighter cases. Further, the view struggles to give a tenable account of the ex ante 
justification of basic perceptual belief. Rejecting this equation (PINK) improves the explanatory 
performance of knowledge-first; but even this view cannot account for the epistemic role of conscious 
perception as a starting point of deliberation. Moreover, the forward-looking account of epistemic 
justification I discussed is problematic, for it implausibly makes epistemic justification hinge on 
whether a belief can provide reasons for further non-epistemic responses.  
 
By comparison, reasons-first is an explanatory over-achiever: It can account for all facets of the role 
of conscious perception in our epistemic lives, and it properly delineates the shape and extent of 
epistemic justification. Coming from a slightly different angle, nonconceptualist reasons-first best 
captures the epistemic features of perception by taking up a middle ground between conceptualist 
PIK, which implausibly accords perception the exact same epistemic role as any other type of 
knowledge; and particularist PINK, which problematically denies it any reason-providing role. It is 
its explanatory merits, then, that speak in favor of reasons-first. 
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1 A note of caution: The scope of my argument is by necessity limited, for even if successful, it throws 
a bad light only on the specific variants of knowledge-first discussed. But there may be other ways in 
which knowledge may be taken as explanatorily fundamental to reasons, which I cannot here address. 
2 I follow established usage here, taking perception to be our successful sensory contact with the 
world, and perceptual experience the mental state that is in common between success cases and cases 
of failed perception such as hallucination. 
3 As endorsed by Williamson (2018: 132) and emphasized by Byrne’s (2016: 962–963) doxastic view, 
“belief [is] a constitutive component of experience, as it is a constitutive component of knowledge”. 
4 Byrne endorses reliabilism and Williamson a safety condition on knowledge. 
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5 The same problem can be raised for Goldman’s reliabilist (1979) understanding of ex ante 
justification. He holds that the subject’s ex ante justification is determined by her cognitive state at 
the time, but it is not clear what all goes into this state, nor why it should be the cognitive state rather 
than the state of her environment that matters. Again, whether we can ascribe the status becomes 
arbitrary. 
6 I thank Christoph Pfisterer for this suggestion. 
7 Further trouble for the forward-looking account is in the offing from suspension of judgment: 
Suspending on p may provide me with reason to suspend on q as well (cf. Turri 2009), but rarely 
seems to give me practical or moral reason to do anything. 
8 This is part of the reason why in my discussion of PIK, I assumed that this view doesn’t come with 
an account of justification in terms of meeting the knowledge norm. The other part of my reason was 
that it is an advantage of PIK that it allows for perception to contribute to the justification of belief 
by providing reasons; an advantage which the knowledge-norm account of justification would 
eliminate. Thanks to Giada Fratantonio for pressing me on this. 
9 See Schmidt (2018) for the nuances of my position on epistemic reasons. 
10 The same holds for the other PANINIs. 
11 Subjects can put themselves in certain perceptual positions for good reasons – for instance, I can 
direct my gaze in a certain direction to better see what is going on there. There is also room for 
epistemically pernicious influences on perception by way of cognitive penetration or biases (cf. Siegel 
2012, 2013), which in my view prevent the manifestation of epistemic rational capacities. 
